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Abstract
Ownership of development processes has been high on the international agenda since the Paris Declaration of
2005. There is, however, much discussion about whether highly aid-dependent governments can really ‘own’
policy reforms in their countries. In this paper, we argue that the ownership of policy reforms is the outcome
of an interaction between individual agency and structural conditions. Taking the implementation of Integrated
Water Resources Management (IWRM) in Burkina Faso (since 1996) and Mali (since 2004) as an entry point,
the paper describes the interplay between national policy makers, international organizations and dominant devel-
opment discourses in the shaping of water policy reforms in both countries over the past 15 years. Despite the
apparent uniformity of the global IWRM paradigm, a qualitative comparison of water policy changes in the
two countries shows that policy reforms, as well as the extent to which they are ‘owned’ by national policy
makers, are significantly distinct. This can be explained by different forms of individual agency and diverse struc-
tural conditions at a national level.
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WWC World Water Council
WWF World Water Forum1. Introduction
The extent to which donors have implicitly or explicitly used official development assistance to pro-
mote donor-aligned policy changes in recipient countries has varied considerably during the history of
development aid (Crawford, 2001; Pronk, 2003). The gradual shift from structural adjustment pro-
grammes in the 1990s to poverty reduction strategies was presented as a renunciation of donor-
driven conditionality in favour of local ownership of aid and development. In the 2000s, the ownership
agenda was further formalized by the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008)
at a global level, and the related Poverty Reduction Strategies or Growth and Sustainable Development
Strategies at a national level.
Nevertheless, many scholars have cast doubts on the veracity of the ownership discourse (Whitfield,
2009; Booth, 2011). Whitfield (2009), for example, demonstrated that a government’s degree of own-
ership of reforms and projects correlates with geopolitical and macro-economic conditions,
independently from international agreements such as the Paris Declaration. Indeed, the cases adduced
by Whitfield show that highly aid-dependent African governments are more likely to write proposals
that align with the ideas of donors. Moreover, although most least developed countries (LDCs) have
their own national development strategies, donors still have a long way to go to actually align their
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indeed perceived differently by different actors; where donors declare their aid as untied, recipient gov-
ernments still perceive the largest portion of the incoming aid as tied.
In this paper we take the discussion of ownership of policy reforms to a more fundamental level, as
we claim that this question can be linked to the century-old quandary of agency versus structure. Com-
paring water policy reforms in two neighbouring West-African countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, we
demonstrate how the dynamics of the reforms and the levels of ownership result from a complex inter-
play between individual agency (displayed by policy entrepreneurs in the national sphere, as well as in
the sphere of the donors and international organizations) and structuring forces (embodied by insti-
tutions and dominant development discourses). Our key informants (reported here anonymously)
include senior international, Malian and Burkinabé decision makers and practitioners in the water sector.
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) constitutes our entry point for the description of
water policy changes in both countries. IWRM is defined by its principal global advocate, the Global
Water Partnership (GWP), as ‘a process that promotes the coordinated development and management
of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare
in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’ (GWP, 2000a).
In practice, the implementation of IWRM supposes a cross-sectoral management of water resources,
as well as a vertical integration of different decision-making levels (GWP, 2000a; Conca, 2006).
IWRM became the dominant paradigm for water managers worldwide in the early 1990s, when it
started being promoted by the United Nations (Conca, 2006). Agenda 21, the influential action plan
that was the outcome of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, invited all nations in the world
to develop national IWRM plans (UN, 1992). This call was repeated in 2002 at the follow-up
summit in Johannesburg.
Despite the fact that, today, nearly two-thirds of all countries in the world have national IWRM plans
(UN-WATER, 2012), and despite the omnipresence of IWRM in water-related development literature,
there is little understanding of how these IWRM plans actually come into being in highly aid-dependent
countries. Given the paramount attention to ownership, what is the relative weight of international devel-
opment actors and of national decision makers in their creation? This paper contributes to filling this gap
through a case study of two West-African countries, Burkina Faso and Mali.
Burkina Faso and Mali have had IWRM plans in place since 2003 and 2008, respectively. In both
cases, the IWRM-inspired water policy reforms were promoted through high-profile national-level pro-
grammes that received financial and technical support from international aid agencies.1 However,
although the two neighbouring countries evince many systemic similarities (among the 15 least devel-
oped countries of the world, heavy reliance on external aid, a large bureaucracy constituting the
backbone of public action and authority, and little developed water resources), the water policy reforms
are characterized by very distinct dynamics, levels of ownership and outcomes. The two countries thus
provide for an interesting and complementary inquiry into water policy making in West Africa.
The following section provides the analytical framework of the study. We draw from the fields of
political science and anthropology of development to shed light on the equilibrium between structure
and agency that characterizes the interactions between donors and national policy makers at times of1 GoBF (2003) estimated that more than 80% of all investments in the water sector during 1996–2001 were funded by actors
other than the national government. In Mali, this percentage amounts to nearly 90% (DNH, 2008).
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fourth section we provide a detailed account of the emergence and implementation of IWRM plans
in Burkina Faso and Mali. After describing the commonalities and differences between the two cases
in the fifth section, the conclusion infers implications for future policy changes in water and natural
resources management in African LDCs.2. Agency versus structure in development processes
In accordance with contemporary social thought, we subscribe to individual agency and social struc-
ture as being two ontological dimensions that reciprocally constitute each other (King, 2004). Our use of
the word ‘structure’, however, transcends particular theories and corresponds in broad terms to the set of
social rules that, imposed upon individuals, ensures social order. In the case of development aid these
rules are embedded in institutions (such as bureaucracies), in the politico-economic relations amongst
actors (including the donor–recipient relationship), in dominant development discourses, and they are
embodied by the individuals themselves as habits and traditions. ‘Agency’, in turn, refers to the capa-
bility of actors to navigate these structuring rules, generate social change despite the structuring rules,
and rewrite the rules.
The development literature has agonized over this agency–structure duality, with different schools of
thought emphasizing one or the other side of the duality. Political science scholars who give priority to
the structural dimensions have shown how, at different points in time, development professionals have
framed development problems in different terms. Hence, at different historical moments, the develop-
ment community have backed different ‘blueprint’ solutions or ‘panacea’ (Roberts, 2004; Ostrom
et al., 2007; Thorbecke, 2007).
Critical anthropologists of development go a step further and claim that, at any given historical
moment, the dominant development discourse encompasses all thinking, and determines which prac-
tices are appropriate and which ones unthinkable. Ferguson, for example, believes that the structural
power of development discourses even curbs the agency of a global policy maker such as the World
Bank: ‘the thoughts and actions of ‘development’ bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by the world of
acceptable statements and utterances within which they live’ (Ferguson, 2007: 18). This vision from
critical anthropology, giving primacy to development discourses in explaining development processes,
has informed a critical body of literature in the water sector (e.g. Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Molle, 2008;
Barnes, 2009; Gupta, 2009; Ingram, 2011). Gupta, for instance, argues that the continuously shifting
discourses in development cooperation have been ‘a driving factor in changing [water] policies and
policy frameworks in the developing world’ (Gupta, 2009: 52), first in promoting large infrastructure
works and irrigation schemes, then by experimenting with different forms of local governance and
privatization.
At the agency end of the spectrum, political scientists have put forward different theories about the
role of individuals and their ‘bounded rationality’ in triggering or sustaining policy change (Table 1).
The ‘discourse coalitions’ theory (Hajer, 1995) and ‘advocacy coalitions’ theory (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993) describe how individuals and organizations with similar interests and belief systems
team up to influence the policy process. Baumgartner & Jones (1991), who claimed that long periods
of gradual policy change are interspersed with short periods of major change, paid tribute in their ‘punc-
tuated equilibrium’ theory to the role of individuals in triggering these sudden, major policy changes.
Table 1. Individual strategies and related policy change theories (adapted from Huitema et al. (2011)).
Individual strategies Underpinning theories of policy change
Promoting ideas Punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991)
Discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995)
Multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984)
Building coalitions Advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993)
Discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995)
Policy networks (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Kriesi, 1994)
Recognizing and exploiting windows of opportunity Multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984)
Shopping for venues Punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991)
Policy networks (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Kriesi, 1994)
Orchestrating networks Policy networks (Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Kriesi, 1994)
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stream consisting of data and proponents of a policy problem, a policy stream consisting of the solution,
and a politics stream propelled by elections and the elected officials. Agile policy entrepreneurs, who
can identify and exploit the ‘window of opportunity’ that appears when the three streams coincide,
can generate major policy changes. Atkinson & Coleman (1989) and Kriesi (1994) have pointed out
that policy change depends on a range of actors – not only state or public actors – who work in
‘policy networks’. As network theory emphasizes the mutually interdependency of actors, this theory
shifts the focus of attention to the role of relationships rather than to individual actors.
In the field of anthropology as well, the alleged power of dominant development discourses has been
deflated by ethnographies that describe how individuals manipulate and negotiate the discourses. In effect,
the process of development policy making and implementation, these ethnographies show, is a concate-
nation of continuous negotiations between different social worlds. Agency appears at any interface where
different social worlds interact (Long & Long, 1992). This agency is embodied by development ‘brokers’
or ‘intermediaries’ at these interfaces (Bierschenk et al., 2000; Lewis & Mosse, 2006).
That individuals also play a crucial role in water policy change has been demonstrated many times.
Rap (2006) described how the success of a World Bank project to transfer irrigation management to
lower levels of decision making in Mexico depended on the intense work of a national, technocratic
policy network behind the scene. Huitema & Meijerink (2009) highlighted the fundamental role of a
small number of key water policy entrepreneurs – with very diverse backgrounds – in generating for-
ward-looking changes in water management in the Netherlands. Drawing on qualitative data
concerning radical water policy change in 15 countries worldwide, Huitema et al. (2011) identified
five strategies that are commonly harnessed by ‘water policy entrepreneurs’ and that echo the policy
change theories described earlier (see Table 1). The five strategies are: promoting new ideas, building
coalitions, recognizing and exploiting windows of opportunity, ‘shopping’ for various venues (different
governmental levels and ministries, media, international networks and forums, multiple donors), and
orchestrating a wider network of formal and informal actors involved in the policy domain.
The above literature review shows that structural conditions such as development discourses and insti-
tutions condition the behaviour of individual actors. Notwithstanding, individual actors have been able
to generate social change on numerous occasions, including in the water sector. Understanding the bal-
ance between individual choices and structural determinants, and the relative importance of national and
international policy entrepreneurs, appears key to the understanding of how water policy changes come
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the two neighbouring countries of Burkina Faso and Mali.3. The emergence of IWRM in the international sphere
Until the 1990s, international and national donor agencies largely ignored the need for water
resources management, as their financial and technical support to the water sector was focused on
the provision of drinking water and sanitation (Conca, 2006). Indeed, the first United Nations Water
Conference, held in 1977 in Mar del Plata, largely focused on drinking water supply and laid the
ground for the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) in 1980–
1990. Towards the end of the 1980s, uneasiness grew in the community of water professionals and aca-
demics (notably within the International Water Resources Association – IWRA) on the grounds that the
cross-sectoral dimension of water was being ignored in most development interventions.
Building on their own first-hand experience of IDWSSD projects which were severely limited by their
sectoral approach, a number of senior water advisors of the Danish International Development Agency
(Danida), which had been an important sponsor of IDWSSD, suggested that Danida establish a Nordic
Freshwater Initiative (NFI) (KII, 2012a). The NFI had the explicit objective of feeding operational
guidelines for integrated water resources planning and management to the forthcoming United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Jønch-Clausen,
1992). Thanks to two key events – the first Stockholm Water Symposium of 1991 and a subsequent
informal consultation with high-level water professionals from multi-lateral agencies in Copenhagen –
a small cluster of Nordic IWRA professionals, united in the NFI, managed to inject into the Rio process
the Copenhagen Statement that advocated two core principles for good water management: (i) water
needs to be managed at the ‘lowest appropriate’ decision-making level; and (ii) it needs to be managed
as ‘a finite resource with an economic value’ (NFI, 1992). The Copenhagen Report is the first document
known to use the phrase ‘integrated water resources management’ (NFI, 1992).
In January 1992, 28 UN agencies and 58 other organizations met in Dublin for the last preparatory
meeting before UNCED and agreed on the so-called Dublin Principles, which directly followed from the
Copenhagen Statement.
UNCED, a political rather than a technical conference, catapulted IWRM into the global sphere
but largely ignored the Dublin Principles. The action plan of UNCED, Agenda 21, was the first
inter-governmental policy document to use the phrase ‘integrated water resources management’ and
the acronym IWRM. The document suggested that all states design national IWRM programmes and
establish institutional IWRM structures by the year 2000 (UN, 1992).
Danida perceived UNCED to be a major success and renewed its engagement in water-related devel-
opment for reasons clearly articulated by one of our key informants: ‘the Danish government was very
happy with the Copenhagen and Dublin Statements and with the impact they had [in Rio], because that
is what governments and donors care about: to have a strong footprint. So, Danida got very keen on this
IWRM’ (KII, 2012a). An earlier presence in Uganda and the involvement of senior Ugandan decision
makers in the NFI prompted Danida to choose that country as a pilot case for the development of a
national Water Action Plan (1993–1994). The Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI), a long-standing partner
of Danida in water affairs, and whose Water and Environment division was led by the former NFI chair,
proved pivotal in the development of this first African IWRM plan.
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fessionals, some of whom highlighted, first, the shift away from the more technical approach of the
Dublin Principles towards a more developmentalist agenda and, second, the fact that Agenda 21 consti-
tuted ‘a long list of unreachable and unfundable targets, with no fewer than 184 activities advocated in
the [water] chapter alone’ (Briscoe & Garn, 1994: 29). In this context, the Dublin Principles, not Agenda
21, continued to inspire the World Bank, OECD, and the French and Nordic bilateral agencies in water
matters (Briscoe & Garn, 1994). This partly explains why the global call for national IWRM plans did
not receive much acclaim.
Together, Danida and DHI engaged in replicating the Ugandan experience in Central America (1997–
99) and Burkina Faso (1998–2001), and co-organized a regional IWRM conference with the Burkinabé
government (COA-GIRE, in Ouagadougou in 1998), where 11 West-African heads of state marked their
commitment to the development of regional and national IWRM plans. At the global level, the institu-
tionalization of IWRM continued with the establishment of a World Water Council (WWC) and a GWP.
The GWP was created upon the initiative of the World Bank, the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) in 1996. It is a global
network organization, with branches at regional and national levels, which advocates the implementation
of IWRM plans and institutions around the world. Upon its creation, GWP was closely linked to Danida
and DHI. The same Danida water professional who had led the NFI became the first chair of the GWP’s
technical committee, and DHI became GWP’s technical secretariat. Also in 1996, the WWC was created,
jointly by IWRA and the French utility company Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux. It is a membership organiz-
ation for private companies, government and development agencies, whose main activity is the
organization of the triennial, highly influential World Water Forum (WWF). This forum is repeatedly
used to advance the IWRM agenda at a global level, as was the case in 2000, when GWP presented a Fra-
mework for Action that again spurred the world to have ‘comprehensive policies and strategies for IWRM
in process of implementation in 75% of countries by 2005 and in all countries by 2015’ (GWP, 2000b).
IWRM reached its global pinnacle at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johan-
nesburg in 2002, 10 years after Rio. Effective lobbying by Denmark, Sweden and Germany through the
European Commission, and by GWP through its well-connected network put IWRM on the Johannesburg
agenda (KII, 2011b; KII, 2012a). Governments were urged, once more, to develop national IWRM plans.
The insistent call rallied new organizations and donors in support of IWRM. On the one hand,
between 2005 and 2008 the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) implemented the so-
called IWRM 2005 Programme to support IWRM planning in over 60 countries and 10 regions of
the world. Danida was the main sponsor, and the UNEP–DHI Centre for Water and Environment
was in charge of implementation. GWP, on the other hand, attracted sponsorship from the Canadian
International Development Agency (Cida) for its new Partnership for Africa’s Water Development
(PAWD), which aimed to develop IWRM plans in five African countries, including Mali.4. Elaborating and implementing IWRM in two West-African countries
4.1. Burkina Faso: local expertise and influence in a precursor country
The first Burkinabé water policy was formulated after the drought of 1973–74 and laid the ground for
state-led infrastructure development programmes. It was revised twice during the 1980s but did not
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gramme implied less involvement of the State in most sectors, including water. By the mid-1990s,
Burkina Faso was one of the first countries to promote and adopt IWRM principles.
Several concomitant conditions contributed to such a shift. First, there was a growing disenchant-
ment, at national level, with the IDWSSD approach that was focused on infrastructure. Second, the
merger in 1995 of the Water Ministry and Environment Ministry brought the issue of water manage-
ment to the fore, in addition to water development. Third, the international and national water
communities were looking for a practical translation to Agenda 21. Fourth, the Burkinabé government
and Danida shared an interest in expanding their long-standing cooperation in the water sector (KII,
2012c).
Leaving aside structural explanations, the shift was shouldered by a small team of committed individ-
uals. As one of the key informants stated, ‘[the reform] boiled down to individuals […] a small group of
people were keen at the idea of change and could defend it vis-à-vis the [minister’s] advisors who do not
like change much’ (KII, 2012c). Alongside this small team of Burkinabé individuals, key members of
Danida and DHI were very supportive of the change. Together they engaged in a review of the water
sector which led to the formulation (in 1998) of a Water Policy and Strategies document and of the
first IWRM programme, and (in 2001) of the water framework law (Loi d’orientation relative à la ges-
tion de l’eau; see Table 2).
The first IWRM programme laid the basis for the development of a National Action Plan for IWRM
(PAGIRE) – still with Danida funding. The PAGIRE was approved in 2003 and provided an overarch-
ing planning framework for the water sector with a horizon of 2015. A permanent secretariat (the SP-
PAGIRE) was set up to monitor and evaluate its implementation.
Concomitantly with the development of the PAGIRE, in 2002 a ministerial reorganization resulted in
the creation of a super ministry of Agriculture, Water and Fisheries (the MAHRH) under the authority of
an influential minister. A new Director General of the General Directorate of the Inventory of Water
Resources (DGRIH, which replaced the DGH and would become the DGRE in 2006) was appointed
and proved influential in shaping the next steps of the policy reform. Although new individuals appeared
on the stage for the development and implementation phase of the PAGIRE, the few policy entrepre-
neurs who had initiated the reform process in the mid-1990s remained highly influential. Until 2004,
the former Director General of DGH acted as the chair of the West African Technical Advisory Com-
mittee (WATAC), a regional satellite of GWP. That one of his close collaborators became the interim
director of the Water Resources Coordination Unit of ECOWAS in 2008 further illustrates the influence
of Burkinabé policy entrepreneurs at the regional level. Among the other people who drove the reform
process in the mid-1990s, one is the current water advisor to the minister for Agriculture and Water,
whilst others have become influential consultants, as highlighted by several key informants (KII,
2012d, e).
Supported by key policy entrepreneurs, the PAGIRE exerted a strong attraction and other develop-
ment partners, such as the Sida, started financing the implementation of the programme.
Organizationally speaking, the development and the implementation of Phase 1 of the PAGIRE
(2003–2008) was characterized by the dominant position assumed by the DGRIH (later the DGRE).
This first phase was dominated by a polarized debate as to whether the SP-PAGIRE should continue
reporting to the DGRE only, or should be instituted as a transversal organization linking various
Table 2. Selected steps in the process of water reforms in Burkina Faso and Mali, and at the regional level.
West Africa (ECOWAS) Burkina Faso Mali
1996 Start formulation of the IWRM
programme (‘Programme GIRE’,
agreement with Denmark).
1998 West-African IWRM conference,
Ouagadougou (organized by
Danida and Government of
Burkina Faso).
Enactment of the Water Policy and
Strategies.
First consultative workshop Water
Code (‘Code de l’Eau’, initiative
of AFD and UNDP).
1999 Creation of West-African Technical
Committee of GWP (WATAC).
Creation of SISCOA-GIRE,
regional secretariat to monitor the
implementation of the 1998
Ouagadougou agreement.
IWRM Programme starts (1999–2001,
funded by Danida). Start of the
Nakambè pilot project (1999–2003,
funded by Danida).
2000 ECOWAS countries adopt Regional
IWRM plan.
2001 Adoption of Water Management
Framework Law (‘Loi d’Orientation
relative à la Gestion de l’Eau’).
PNIR project starts (2001–2008,
funded by World Bank).
2001 Formulation of PAGIRE starts.
2002 Creation of GWP West Africa. Ministerial reorganization: water is
included in MAHRH ministry;
Environment moves to a separate
ministry. VREO project starts
(2002–2008).
Creation of Malian Niger River
Basin Agency (funded by AFD).
Adoption of Water Code.
2003 Regional IWRM conference COA-
GIREþ 5.
PAGIRE ready and adopted. PAGIRE
Phase 1 starts. Creation of SP-
PAGIRE for the monitoring of
PAGIRE implementation.
Creation IWRM Unit at DNH.
Creation PNE-Mali. GWP, PNE-
Mali and DNH sign PAWD
agreement.
2004 Creation of the Water Resources
Coordination Unit under the
ECOWAS.
Creation of the Water Technical
Committee (cooperation platform).
Start setting up Local Water
Committees (CLE).
GIRENS project starts, creation of
CLEs (2004–2010, funded by the
Netherlands). Elaboration of
PAGIRE starts (2004–2007,
supported by GWP and CIDA).
2006 26 CLEs are set up by the DGRE
(funded by Danida, SIDA, AFD).
National Water Policy adopted (in
the framework of PAWD).
2007 Creation of Volta Basin Agency.
World Bank starts Niger Basin
project, incl. strengthening of
NBA.
Creation of the Nakambé Basin
Agency.
PAGIRE ready.
2008 IWRM-based Regional Water Policy. PAGIRE adopted. Creation of inter-
ministerial CPS and PROSEA
(supported by Danida).
2009 The PAGIRE enters 2nd phase (2009–
2015).
Donor round-table to collect
funding for the PAGIRE
implementation.
(Continued.)
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Table 2. (Continued.)
West Africa (ECOWAS) Burkina Faso Mali
2010 Expanded SP-PAGIRE put under the
General secretariat of the MAHRH.
Implementation of PAGIRE in
Mouhoun river basin. Creation of
Mouhoun Basin Agency.
PROSEA (2010–2014) takes off,
incl. implementation of PAGIRE.
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the donors, won the case, precipitating the departure of the Director General of DGRE.2 This first phase
centred on institutional building at the national level and on pilot activities in the Nakambé Basin. Sim-
ultaneously, from 2002 onwards, the European Union funded the VREO project (Valorisation des
Ressources en Eau de l’Ouest) under the MAHRH. The VREO became the main conduit through
which the PAGIRE would be implemented in the west of the country, but not without some friction.
Indeed, the VREO was a decentralized project, under the authority of an influential policy entrepreneur
and with a separate management team in Bobo-Dioulasso. It was owned by a few individuals who saw
the PAGIRE as yet another framework imposed on them from Ouagadougou (KII, 2012f). The VREO
team would eventually become the technical wing of the Mouhoun Basin Agency.
Describing the processes of policy formulation at the national level and the interplay between donors
and several government departments or ministries only gives a partial picture of the policy process.
Local actors (such as policy entrepreneurs, independent consultants and small scale consulting compa-
nies) weighed significantly on the shaping of policy, especially regarding the setup of new
organizations, such as the Local Water Committees (CLEs) and river basin agencies. In principle, the
task of setting up CLEs was the responsibility of the DGRE. The guiding principles, however, had
been conceived by a few national consultants – the same individuals who had driven the reform process
in the mid-1990s. CLEs were initially devised to manage water at watershed level but they were even-
tually set up to manage the productive exploitation of well circumscribed water bodies (e.g. irrigated
perimeters) – a key objective of the MAHRH. This illustrates how an international water policy
model (IWRM) was de facto adjusted to the national priorities of one specific government department.
In the case of the CLEs, local consulting companies contracted by the DGRE, or the ‘deconcentrated’
structures of the MAHRH themselves, had a tremendous impact on the folding out and operation of
IWRM.
4.2. Mali: donor-driven reforms with narrow national ownership
Between 2000 and 2012 six different ministers and three different ministries have held the water port-
folio in Mali. Practical planning and project implementation, however, are carried out by ‘directorates’,
the executive arms of ministries, whose delineations have remained relatively stable over time. The2 The Director General of DGRE joined the African Development Bank in 2008. He argued that the creation of an SP-PAGIRE
under the authority of the Secretary General was a move in the wrong direction, as it would ‘remove the teeth’ of a programme
already critiqued for its lack of practical outcomes in the field.
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responsible for the planning and management of water supply and IWRM projects. Heir of a similar
structure from colonial times, the DNH is the main entry point for donors interested in water-related
cooperation and has counted a number of permanent western technical advisors in its ranks, virtually
since its creation (Matz, 2010). The National Directorate of Sanitation and of Pollution and Nuisance
Control (DNACPN), which reports to the minister in charge of environment, has an important secondary
role in water supply and sanitation projects but cannot rely on the same technical and managerial experi-
ence as the DNH (Danida, 2010).
Until 1991, the predecessor of DNH had sole responsibility for the planning, construction and man-
agement of water infrastructure in Mali. Since the adoption of decentralization laws in the mid-1990s,
municipalities have been entrusted with the ownership and responsibility of water infrastructure devel-
opment and management. Concurrently, the technical directorates have also been deconcentrated, with
the view of providing technical assistance to the municipalities. Water legislation lagged behind the
decentralization laws and, in 1998, the French Development Agency (AFD) in collaboration with
UNDP supported the Malian government in the elaboration of a nationalWater Code (Table 2). Adopted
in 2002, the Water Code confirmed the decentralized ownership of water infrastructures and laid the
legal foundations for basin agencies and CLEs.
AFD, keen to promote a French-like model of water management, also supported the creation of a
Malian Niger River Basin Agency (ABFN) under the direct jurisdiction of the Minister of the Environ-
ment in 2002. This move threatened the position of DNH as the main interlocutor of development
partners in the water management sector (Matz, 2010). Following a second regional conference on
IWRM in Ouagadougou in 2003 (COA-GIREþ 5), and with the support of the World Bank-sponsored
National Rural Infrastructure Project (PNIR, 2001–2007), the DNH replicated the AFBN by setting up
an IWRM unit themselves (KII, 2012e). The senior hydrologist, who had been acting as the liaison offi-
cer for the DNH at the international Niger Basin Authority (NBA) and who was one of the promoters of
the IWRM Unit, was appointed at its head. Already known to GWP as the Malian focal point for the
elaboration of the West African Water Vision, this person also became the chair of the Malian Country
Water Partnership (PNE-Mali), set up by GWP in 2003. Highly regarded by donors (KII, 2012b, d, e),
he became the central pivot for IWRM projects in Mali. ABFN, on the contrary, never attracted much
support (KII, 2012e).
Between 2004 and 2007, GWP guided Mali through the process of developing a national IWRM plan
within the context of its PAWD. It identified DNH and PNE-Mali as lead organizations for the
implementation of the PAWD project in Mali. PAWD took off in 2004 with the development of a
road map for IWRM planning that was owned by a broad section of water stakeholders, thanks to
the involvement of PNE-Mali (Cox & Patterson, 2008; KII, 2010). After a quick diagnosis of the
water sector, this road map yielded a National Water Policy in 2005 and a national IWRM Action
Plan (PAGIRE) in 2007.
Although many stakeholders considered the process as more inclusive than that of other projects
(especially compared to the World Bank PNIR project), the finalization of the PAGIRE was centralized
within the IWRM Unit of DNH (Cox & Patterson, 2008; KII, 2012e), under the impetus of its director
who also chaired PNE-Mali. The double mandate held by this single policy maker also meant that local
stakeholders had difficulties in distinguishing PNE-Mali from the governmental IWRM Unit, and it hin-
dered PNE-Mali in playing the role of independent watchdog. The ownership of PAGIRE was eventually
limited to a few people in DNH, whose sense of ownership was very high (KII, 2012d, e).
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gramme at field level in the Upper Niger Basin (GIRENS, 2004–2010) that engaged in creating basin
and sub-basin agencies and CLEs. For historical reasons, the GIRENS programme was not managed by
the IWRM Unit of DNH, but by its Hydrology Division.3 When the PAGIRE was being developed, the
two units competed with one another, mostly because of faltering donor collaboration (KII, 2012e). The
rivalry abated towards the end of the PAGIRE process and most of the GIRENS action plan was even-
tually included in the PAGIRE, as practical recommendations on the development of CLEs and sub-
basin agencies.
The PAGIRE plan was officially adopted in April 2008 but implementation was not guaranteed by
any donor. However, the aid landscape of Mali’s water sector had started changing in 2006 with the
arrival of Danida as a new donor. In line with the Paris Declaration, Danida chose to support the
embryonic attempt of DNH and DNACPN to develop a Programme for Sectoral Budget Support to
Water and Sanitation (PROSEA). Danida supported the creation of an inter-ministerial Cell for Planning
and Statistics (CPS) in 2008. This cell has gradually assumed the authority over PROSEA but heavily
depends, to date, on Danish technical support. At a donor round-table organized by the head of the
IWRM Unit of DNH and the senior technical assistant of GIRENS in February 2009, Danida, Sida
and the African Development Bank pledged to support PROSEA. PROSEA finally took off in 2010
and identified the implementation of PAGIRE as one of its four objectives. The programme partly suc-
ceeded in aligning the strategies of international development partners and multiple governmental
structures.5. Discussion
5.1. Structural context
Policy reforms in Burkina Faso and Mali went through comparable stages. Before the development of
a national IWRM action plan started, donors first focused on broad institutional and policy reforms that
lasted between 4 and 6 years and which led to the Water Management Framework Law in Burkina Faso
(2001) and to the Water Code in Mali (2002). This initial period was also characterized by tentative
IWRM activities such as the IWRM Programme in Burkina Faso and GIRENS project in Mali. In a
second phase, national IWRM Action Plans (PAGIRE) were developed; this phase lasted 2 years in Bur-
kina Faso (2001–2003) and 4 years in Mali (2004–2007). The third phase, the implementation of the
national IWRM action plans, started in 2003 in Burkina Faso and in 2010 in Mali.
Other structural resemblances follow from similar administrative cultures in both countries. First,
water policy reforms have been dominated by the technical directorates of the ministry in charge of
water (DGRE in Burkina Faso and DNH in Mali), despite a wide participation of national stakeholders
in the process. Second, a similar organizational change has taken place in both countries with the
PAGIRE now being under the authority of a directorate-independent cell (the SP-PAGIRE in Burkina
Faso and the CPS in Mali). This move echoes broader calls for, and support to, a programmatic
approach to development aid and marks the recognition of water as a cross-sectoral resource.3 Now called the Division for Water Resources Monitoring and Management.
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with their respective donors. The Burkinabé story shows much more continuity than does the Malian.
The reforms in Burkina Faso started in the mid-1990s with funding from Danida, which was already a
long-standing donor to the Burkinabé water sector and, since then, has consistently supported the elab-
oration and implementation of the PAGIRE. In Mali, by contrast, the early donors in water management
(AFD, the Netherlands, the World Bank, Cida) adopted a project rather than a sectoral approach and
have steered the process of reform according to their own and sometimes conflicting visions of
IWRM. While there is currently an attempt to harmonize approaches within the framework of the sec-
toral PROSEA programme, the director of DNH in Mali still laments that too many foreign consultants
are coming in, each of them bringing their own ideas (KII, 2011a). This lack of continuity in Mali’s
donors was mimicked by frequent ministerial changes, whereas in Burkina Faso one single minister
oversaw most of the reform process between 1996 and 2008.5.2. The role of individual policy entrepreneurs
Despite structural similarities, our accounts have shown that individual policy entrepreneurs played a
central role at all levels and in all phases. For one thing, IWRM did not become the dominant paradigm
worldwide in a disembodied or deterministic fashion. The prominence of the IWRM paradigm in the
international sphere is the result of the unrelenting work of a small number of dedicated water pro-
fessionals and organizations. Using the concepts of Table 1, we can say that a small group of
individuals took advantage of the ‘window of opportunity’ at the end of the IDWSSD decade when
a ‘problem stream’ (the overly sectoral approach of IDWSSD) joined a ‘policy stream’ (in the form
of IWRM) and a ‘politics stream’ (in the form of the Rio and Johannesburg Conferences). In order
to advocate IWRM, they also ‘shopped for numerous venues’ in the international sphere and ‘orche-
strated a tight network’ of IWRM-inspired organizations including GWP, WWC, IWRA, Danida,
DHI, DHI-UNEP, and others.
At a national level, too, the IWRM-inspired reforms were embodied in individual policy entrepre-
neurs, who assumed different types, forms and levels of engagement, hence yielding distinct reform
dynamics and outcomes. The IWRM idea was promoted in West Africa by an ‘advocacy coalition’
of Danish water professionals flanked by Burkinabé policy makers. As the IWRM idea gained accep-
tance, a small number of these Burkinabé policy makers, from their key positions in the national water
bureaucracy, ‘orchestrated a policy network’ that made them highly influential both at national and
regional level. The head of DGRE played a particularly pivotal role, even though there has been an
ongoing debate on instituting the SP-PAGIRE as a directorate-independent entity. The ‘orchestration
of the network’ was facilitated by the regional and international venues provided for by Danida and
later also GWP. By ‘shopping for these venues’ the Burkinabé network managed to steer the water
reforms at regional level (ECOWAS) in a similar direction to that followed in Burkina Faso (KII,
2012c). The Burkinabé IWRM network can count on a large pool of competent national consultants
(KII, 2012d, e), many of who are former civil servants. These consultants are an integral part of this
‘policy network’; they are pivotal in shaping the practice of policy, as they are regularly contracted
by governments and regional organizations to draft terms of reference for studies and projects, and
for policy implementation guidelines. Such engagement in international forums has not been observed
in Mali.
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gorated by organizational rivalries. In 2003, 1 year after AFD had supported the creation of the
Malian ABFN, and had linked it to the Minister of Environment, DNH created its own IWRM Unit.
This was possible because a few DNH water professionals recognized a window of opportunity
when the ‘problem stream’ (the non-existence of a water resources management unit at DNH) encoun-
tered a ‘policy stream’ (the World Bank PNIR project and the upcoming PAWD project). Another
‘window of opportunity’ appeared when Danida entered the scene and was willing to sponsor the sec-
toral budget support programme (PROSEA). The high visibility of the IWRM Unit and its head
impeded ABFN from playing any noteworthy role in the water sector.5.3. Qualitative differences in ownership
Water policy reforms need the initiative of policy entrepreneurs. The way in which those entrepre-
neurs can manifest their agency, however, depends on structural conditions. As these structural
conditions influence the strategies of policy entrepreneurs, they also determine the quality of local own-
ership. This is clearly exemplified by the Burkinabé and Malian cases.
Stable donor support and sufficient human resources in Burkina Faso allowed Burkinabé policy entre-
preneurs to join the growing ‘IWRM discourse coalition’ and to ‘orchestrate a policy network’ that
nowadays extends to the regional and international level. This network is both the expression and war-
rant of a broad Burkinabé ownership of their water policy reforms. This strong ownership, in exchange,
has altered the structural conditions of the Burkinabé reality, such as the relationship with the donors.
Malian policy makers, on the contrary, are regularly criticized for not assuming ownership, but for
awaiting assistance and for ‘accepting all external aid that is being offered’ (Bergamaschi, 2009).
Our account has showed that this interpretation is too superficial. In a structural context of weak min-
isterial leadership and highly fragmented sponsorship, a few policy entrepreneurs effectively employed a
pro-active strategy of ‘drawing together the streams’ of donor support and exploited a few ‘windows of
opportunity’ to the maximum. The ownership of water policy reforms in Mali is narrowly vested, but in
a very important way, in a small number of water policy makers at DNH and a few long-serving western
technical assistants.
Huitema & Meijerink (2009) argue that the work of policy entrepreneurs is a necessary but not suffi-
cient factor in policy change; this paper would add to this that local policy entrepreneurship is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for local ownership. Structural conditions (such as the legacies
of the donor–recipient relationship or the quality of national human resources) and the actions of inter-
national organizations (for instance, the choice to engage with one policy entrepreneur rather than with
another) determine, to a large extent, the way in which policy makers in the aid-receiving country own
the policy change.6. Conclusion
The commitment to work towards higher development ownership in the South, made by donors and
aid agencies in Paris and Accra, tacitly assumed that aid recipients in the South possessed enough
agency to assimilate the ‘ownership’ of their development (Booth, 2011). This paper engages with
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interplay between agency and structure.
To do so, the paper has adduced empirical data from the observation of the emergence of IWRM dis-
courses and policies at the global level and in two Sub-Saharan countries, Burkina Faso and Mali.
Although some critics have described IWRM as just another ‘nirvana concept’ (Molle, 2008) or the
‘lingua franca’ for water scholars and practitioners (Ingram, 2011), our account shows that this allegedly
‘hegemonic paradigm’ (Conca, 2006) has been shaped by the relentless work of individuals at global
and local level, and has acquired different realities in Burkina Faso and Mali. The differences observed
between the two countries are, in the first place, due to differing structural determinants, such as the
legacies of earlier donor–recipient collaborations, the attitudes of donors and national policy makers
in engaging with each other, and the availability of human resources. Within these different structural
contexts, water policy makers have also displayed dissimilar forms of agency. In Burkina Faso they
mostly engaged in ‘orchestrating a broad water policy network’ that extends to the regional level,
while in Mali they mainly took advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’ when the international
‘policy stream’ connected to the national ‘problem stream’.
This paper concludes that it is structural conditions which largely determine the strategies that policy
entrepreneurs can employ to promote and own a policy change. Through their agency, however, policy
entrepreneurs try to remodel the structural context and carve out more space for ownership. The form
and quality of ownership is the result of this complex interaction between structural conditions and
the agency of the policy entrepreneurs.
If donors and aid agencies really want to contribute to an increased ownership of development in the
South, they will need to reflect upon the fact that their own actions directly influence the structural con-
ditions, and hence the form and level of ownership a recipient can and will assume.Acknowledgements
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